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ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

FLASH

19402 1691934

X 181847Z JUN 74 ZYH

FM MOSCOW

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

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FM WALTER J. STOESSEL, JR., NORMAN TERRELL, MOSCOW 037

TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT, WHITE HOUSE

SIT ROOM: PLEASE PASS ASAP TO JAN LODAL AND HELMUT SONNENFELDT

MORI/CDF per C05147225

WE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE SOME MUTUALLY SHARED OBSERVATIONS ON WHERE WE NOW STAND AND WHERE WE NEED GO IN THE NEXT WEEK AND A HALF.

1. DATA EXCHANGE.

MOROKHOV IS OBVIOUSLY WAITING FOR INSTRUCTIONS TO MAKE SOME POSITIVE REACTION TO OUR DATA EXCHANGE PROPOSAL. IT IS CLEAR THAT THIS WILL INVOLVE AT BEST A LIMITED AMOUNT OF CONCRETE DATA. IT IS MUCH MORE LIKELY, HOWEVER, TO OPEN THE WAY FOR AN AGREED FRAMEWORK OF DATA REQUIREMENTS TO SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR AN INFORMATION EXCHANGE AFTER THE SUMMIT.

WE THINK IT WILL PROVE UNPRODUCTIVE, THEREFORE, TO CONTINUE HAMMERING AWAY AT THE SOVIETS FOR CONCRETE DATA AFTER MOROKHOV HAS HIS INSTRUCTIONS. WHAT WOULD BE MORE USEFUL WOULD BE TO HAVE A U.S. PROPOSAL ON FUTURE INFORMATION EXCHANGE READY TO TABLE WITH A SUGGESTION THAT A SUB-GROUP OF EXPERTS, USING OUR PAPER AS A STARTING POINT, IMMEDIATELY BEGIN WORKING OUT A JOINT REPORT. IT MAY BE POSSIBLE, IF WE PROCEED ON THIS BASIS, TO HAVE SOME UNDERSTANDING BY THE SUMMIT WHAT OBLIGATIONS ON DATA EXCHANGE THE TWO SIDES WOULD UNDERTAKE. (WE WILL TRY TO GET A DELEGATION CABLE OUT ON THIS TOMORROW. IN THE MEANTIME, YOU MIGHT BE THINKING OF HOW TO HANDLE IT.).

ONE LAST POINT ON A DATA FRAMEWORK. WE SHOULD LEAVE THE DOOR OPEN TO DECIDE THAT MORE, LESS OR DIFFERENT DATA IS NEEDED AS THE POST-SUMMIT TECHNICAL TALKS PROCEED. IT SHOULD ALSO BE MADE CLEAR PUBLICLY THAT ANY DEAL WE WORK OUT AT THE SUMMIT ON NUMBERS, YIELD VALUE AND SO ON IS CONTINGENT ON A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY DATA EXCHANGE. (THIS WOULD ALSO JUSTIFY THE JANUARY 1 1976, EFFECTIVE DATE.)

2. QUOTA.

IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE QUOTA COULD BE A STICKING POINT AT THE SUMMIT. WE ARE IMPRESSED WITH THE INSISTENCE WITH WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE PRESSED THE QUOTA (SEE TODAY'S STOESSEL/MOROKHOV PRIVATE CONVERSATION). WE STILL THINK THE SOVIET QUOTA IDEA

***** WHSR COMMENT ***** DOS, OSD, DOE, JCS reviews completed

KENNEDY

LODAL + Sonnenfeldt

PSN:022405

PAGE 01

TOR:169/19:42Z

DTG:181847Z JUN 74

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HAS REAL PROBLEMS. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD EVALUATE WHETHER
TIMERBAEV'S FACTOR-OF-TWO IDEA OF SAFRONOV'S LOWER-THRESHOLD
ACCIDENT ALLOWANCE OFFER ANY POSSIBILITIES. IN ANY CASE
WE SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR AN ADAMANT SOVIET STAND ON QUOTA
AT THE SUMMIT.

3. PNE'S.

MOROKHOV'S PNE PROPOSAL OF TODAY OFFERS A GOOD BASIS
TO PROCEED. WE THINK A MORATORIUM ON PNE'S WHILE THE US-
SOVIET BILATERALS WORK OUT AN AGREED PNE SCHEME COULD FIX
IT. THIS MIGHT BE AGREED PRIVATELY. IN ANY EVENT, WE SHOULD
MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT THERE IS NO WAY WE WILL
AGREE TO PNE'S ABOVE AN UPPER THRESHOLD.

4. DELEGATION POLITICS.

THE NEW SENIOR REPS FROM JCS, OSD AND AEC ARE CONCERNED
THAT OUR INSTRUCTIONS SEEM TO LIMIT THEIR FLEXIBILITY TO DIS-
CUSS IMPORTANT POLICY ISSUES. (WALSH HAS ALREADY COMMUNICATED
PRIVATELY TO WADE IN THIS SENSE.) FIRST, THEY WANT AUTHORITY
TO GO MORE DEEPLY INTO THE VALUE OF THE UPPER YIELD THRESHOLD
WITH THE SOVIETS, BOTH SMKING OUT SOVIET VIEWS AND ACTIVELY
PRESENTING OUR OWN IDEAS. SECOND, THEY WANT US THRESHOLD
POLICY CHANGED TO EMBRACE A QUOTA ABOVE THE THRESHOLD. THIS
LATTER IDEA, WHICH WE UNDERSTAND ALSO HAS SOME CURRENCY IN
WASHINGTON, IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF KEEPING OUR SILO-BUSTING
OPTIONS OPEN. WE WILL STALL AND ARGUE HERE, BUT EVENTUALLY
WE MAY HAVE TO SEND A DELEGATION CABLE BACK ON THESE POINTS.
IF SO, IT WILL REFLECT SPLIT VIEWS WITHIN THE DELEGATION,
WITH THE CHAIRMAN RECOMMENDING NEGATIVELY.

WARM REGARDS.

PSN:022405

PAGE 02

OF 02

TOR:169/19:42Z

DTG:181847Z JUN 74

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